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Why Afghanistan is not a safe 
country of origin
Katja Mielke \ BICC
Elke Grawert \ BICC
RECOMMENDATIONS
\ No repatriation of Afghan refugees
Reconstruction and the establishment of peace in 
Afghanistan have failed. Germany, as party to the 
intervention, has to accept its share of responsibility 
for this failure. The German government can do this 
in their policies towards the Afghan refugees by 
offering them with prospects both in Germany and in 
Afghanistan, rather than deporting them. 
\ Controlled immigration 
With a well-managed immigration system, the 
German government, governments of the European 
Union, the OECD and of BRICS countries as well 
as governments of Afghanistan’s neighbouring 
countries can make an important contribution to 
the population’s security and to overcoming future 
challenges. Within a relatively short period of time, 
refugees ought to be able not only to obtain a status 
that allows them access to education, training and 
further qualification measures but also to work, which 
will give them the chance of integrating into host 
societies. This would also strengthen the potential 
of Afghans who already live abroad to help and to 
provide help for their fellow countrymen and –women 
staying in Afghanistan. In addition, opportunities for 
immigrants to qualify for legal migration opportunities 
(through immigration law, for instance) ought to 
remain open.  
\ Long-term, needs-based  
reconstruction strategy  
A long-term, possibly decade-long investment 
strategy is necessary to support sustainable economic 
development driven by the internal market and 
Afghan purchasing power. Development projects 
must be integrated into this strategy and complement 
corresponding public measures by the Afghan 
government while taking into account the need of the 
private sector for reliable rules and regulations. It is of 
critical importance to expand and diversify vocational 
training centres where the Afghan youth can obtain 
qualifications needed on the internal job market and 
develop prospects for the future in their country.
\ Accompanying measures:  
Land and peace 
The German government must make greater use 
of its diplomatic influence in working towards a 
consensus for a viable roadmap for peace with the 
participation of the governments of Pakistan, Iran, 
the United States, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and 
India. It should also press for legal access to land and 
housing for all those who have returned and who 
were displaced within the last 15 years.
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In 2015, 150,000 people left Afghanistan for Germany.1 
They fled from prosecution, violence and lack of future 
prospects in their country—after 15 years of internati-
onal reconstruction efforts. Now, the German govern-
ment is planning to repatriate Afghan refugees, some 
of whom have been living in Germany for years. Politi-
cal decision-makers speak of intra-state alternatives for 
the displaced, of secure zones within Afghanistan whe-
re they could be deported to. This idea, however, can 
only be interpreted as empty rhetoric of the German 
government to show the public that it is working on 
decreasing the number of refugees in Germany. An in-
crease in bombings, suicide attacks, fighting between 
the army and the Taliban as well as criminal violence 
in more and more districts of Afghanistan comes on 
top of a massive economic crisis, high youth unemplo-
yment, forced displacement, land loss and a paralysed 
political leadership—a situation the authors experien-
ced themselves during their one-month field research 
in Kabul and Herat in November 2015. The complex 
insecurity situation, in which the Afghan population 
finds itself after the withdrawal of the international en-
gagement in Afghanistan in 2014, is obvious. Germany 
must bear its share of responsibility for this by promo-
ting future prospects for Afghan refugees in Germany 
rather than pushing for deportations. 
Physical insecurity: Victims of political 
violence and displacement
Since 2014, the security situation has worsened rapidly 
and remains highly precarious. In large cities, such as 
Kabul (approx. four million inhabitants), Jalalabad 
(more than 350,000) and Herat (more than 800,000), 
every day, citizens are at risk of becoming victims of 
suicide bombers or of being kidnapped. In Kabul alone, 
four large bombings occurred in the first five weeks of 
the year 2016. In the rural areas, insecurity grew after 
the strategic (re-)armament of formerly disarmed 
1 \ From January to April 2016, another 29,641 Afghan refugees filed their 
first asylum application in Germany (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge. 2016. “Aktuelle zahlen zu Asyl.” April , p. 8. http://www.
bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/
aktuelle-zahlen-zu-asyl-april-2016.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 
28 October 2016.
militias in the past years. The consequence of far-rea-
ching criminality and the intimidation of the rural po-
pulation 
as well as irregular taxation of rural produce through 
local militias is that no one can afford to be ‚neutral‘.  
In the south and east of Afghanistan as in the districts 
surrounding the large cities, merciless fighting between 
armed Taliban groups and the army as well as interna-
tional troops is taking place. Travelling outside of these 
cities is highly dangerous. Besides various Taliban fac-
tions, numerous other armed groups fight against the 
state and, in part, against each other.2 In 2014, 12,500 
soldiers and police officers died; in 2015, the number 
increased to 16,000. The number of civilian victims of 
the conflict has been steadily rising since 2009. Until 
June 2016, the UN counted 22,941 civilian deaths and 
40,993 injured. The numbers rose in 2014 and 2015, 
with, 3,700 civilians killed and more than 6,800 injured 
in 2014 and 3,545 killed and 7,457 injured in 2015. In 
the first half of 2016, 122 violent attacks were claimed 
by the Taliban, of which 71 targeted security forces and 
51 civilians. So-called Islamic State killed 122 civilians 
in the same period, during which the total number of 
civilian deaths through armed groups amounted to 
1,601 whereas 3,565 were severely injured.3 The tem-
porary seizure of Kunduz by the Taliban at the end of 
September 2015 and again in October 2016 are thus 
not exceptions but rather reflect the increased degree 
of violence. 
The rising amount of armed violence was responsible 
for the displacement of another 158,000 people in the 
first half of 2016. With this, the official figure of inter-
nally displaced people in Afghanistan directly resulting 
from violent conflicts has exceeded 1.2 million.4 People 
 
2 \ According to a September 2015 UN Assessment quoted in the media, 
since the summer of 2015, 25 of the 34 provinces showed signs of the 
presence of so-called Islamic State (IS) (http://news.yahoo. com/islamic-
state gaining ground afghanistan un 235952988.html). The significance of IS 
is controversial; in particular the relationship between the Taliban and IS.
3 \  All figures from UNAMA/UNHCR. 2016. “Afghanistan Midyear Report 
2016. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. July, https://unama.
unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_in_armed_
conflict_midyear_report_2016_final.pdf, accessed 28.10.2016.
4 \ As a result of natural catastrophes (earth quakes), another 130,000 are 
displaced (International Organization for Migration, 2016).
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fled mostly to the capitals of the provinces or left their 
home regions entirely. Stricter migration regulations 
and the ensuing discrimination of Afghans in the 
neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Iran reduce  
regional options for those who flee. About 1.5 million 
registered Afghan refugees have lived in Pakistan for 
years; in Iran, 950,000 Afghans were still registered by 
mid-2015. The number of unreported cases of Afghans 
who live illegally in the neighbouring countries is sub-
stantially higher; in Pakistan, the estimated number is 
about 1.5 million, between 1.4 and two million in Iran. 
They are also victims of discrimination and persecution. 
Many of these migrants have not only fled and returned 
from one region of Afghanistan or a neighbouring 
country once but multiple times.
Economic insecurity
International donor and aid organizations have provided 
the Afghan government under Hamid Karzai (2002–
2014) with significant financial support after the fall of 
the Taliban government in 2001, driving the restruc-
turing of the country into a liberal market economy 
When the international forces and organizations were 
reduced in Afghanistan in 2014, it became clear that 
the economy had been mainly reliant on orders from 
the alliance and that economic sustainability or even a 
self-sustaining restructuring process had never been 
achieved. Growth rates that had fluctuated around 10 
per cent since 2005 already dropped to nearly two per 
cent in 2013—in anticipation of the withdrawal—and 
since 2014 have been close to zero. Construction, 
transportation, logistics and service companies as well 
as security providers had been major contributors to 
the strong economic growth. They were founded as a 
response to the high demand for modern buildings, 
the expansion of infrastructure, delivery of goods for 
international employees and providing protection to 
these employees through private security companies. 
Increasingly, these companies in particular fall victim 
to attacks by the Taliban, who consider them to be col-
laborators with international troops and organizations. 
In 2015, many of these companies were facing bank-
ruptcy due to the lack of customers and had to suspend 
nearly all of their staff.5 The threatened closure of these 
companies constituted a blow to the Afghan economy, 
which risked losing an important stake in the produc-
tion and service sectors. Only a new beginning of 
long-term investment programmes in the framework 
of a coherent overall international donor strategy 
could prevent such a blow from happening. Such a 
strategy should not only foster predictability and offer 
perspectives but also make sure that there are oppor-
tunities for employment, vocational training and 
professionalization. 
The faltering economic policy of the ‘unity government’ 
under the leadership of Ashraf Ghani und Abdullah 
Abdullah (since 2014) does not improve the situation 
either. After more than a year in office, it has become 
increasingly uncertain whether Afghan President 
Ghani‘s reform agenda with the promising title “Real-
izing Self-Reliance” will actually be implemented. In 
2015, 71 per cent of the state budget depended on  
foreign money. Import and export companies, such as 
transport businesses, deplore the open corruption at 
border crossings that prevents exact cost calculations. 
Many have been struggling for survival since 2014 and 
only employ their staff on a daily basis.6 Monetary 
transfers of the drug and contraband economy, lacking 
capacities of the finance authorities and opaque levies 
of taxes and duties increase mistrust in the state. Yet 
the labour market is not the only factor through which 
the population is affected by the economic decline and 
the lack of investments. Increasing fuel prices as well as 
high rates of inflation increasing the price of food make 
life even more difficult. So far, the State has hardly been 
seen to engage in the fight against poverty or in the 
support of development and reform—one effect of its 
market orientation.
5 \  Result of interviews with company owners in Kabul, Nangahar, Herat 
and Kandahar by the research team (BICC, TLO and International 
Alert) in 2015 in the framework of the research project, funded by the 
NWO-WOTRO, https://www.bicc.de/research themes/ project/project/
conflict sensitive employment under construction peace and stability-
strategies for the private sec/
6 \  cf. footnote 5.
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persons, a piece of land on which they can live without 
having to fear further displacement is the foundation 
upon which they could begin to create a source of in-
come.7 Their disappointment has become even greater 
since Ashraf Ghani, who was elected President in 2014, 
has not taken any steps thus far to keep his campaign 
promise to provide displaced people with access to 
land and ownership titles. At the same time, the illegal 
appropriation of land—lucrative plots in urban areas 
or along arterial roads, but also farming land—by in-
fluential persons has reached a scale never before seen. 
The government has shown itself to be incapable of 
curbing these land grabbing practices. Based on the 
long-standing cooperation with international economic 
organizations and the Afghan government, the German 
government ought to encourage the Afghan government 
to make legal access to land and housing for the dis-
placed and returnees possible.
Given that the Afghan Government does not have a 
monopoly of violence, the principle of ‚ might is right‘ 
rules in Afghanistan. Patronage and patron–client rela-
tionships prevail, and families are searching for the 
protection of the most powerful patron to minimize 
the risks against them. Even though the constitution 
explicitly stresses gender equality, massive human 
rights violations, such as honour killings, forced and 
child marriages as well as the trafficking of girls and 
women are common. In cases where violence against 
women has been committed, the victims have hardly 
any chance of reporting it; violent crime in general is 
hardly ever prosecuted. Due to political instability and 
the power struggles of diverse actors, the state can 
hardly guarantee the right to physical well-being. 
Women experience violence and discrimination in 
their families, but also in the political and economic 
spheres where gender equality is sadly lacking. 
7 \  Outcome of interviews conducted by the authors in irregular settle-
ments in Kabul in the framework of research projects supported by the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF) https://www.bicc.de/research themes/project/project/protected 
rather than protracted strengthening refugees and peace 122/ sowie https://
www.bicc.de/research themes/project/project/crossroads asia research-
network on conflicts migration and development 127/.
It is therefore clear that for the German government and 
the international community, a gradual reduction of their 
financial commitment has significant consequences. What 
is needed is a long-term reconstruction strategy to repair 
the damages caused by ten years of economic development 
geared to the self-interest of internationals, and to intro-
duce a sound, sustainable development plan created by 
the internal market and Afghan purchasing power. It is 
not enough to carry out diverse individual development 
projects—on the contrary: they will have to be embedded 
in this very strategy and complement corresponding  
public measures of the Afghan government and the  
private sector. 
Fear and lack of prospects
The uneven distribution of access to land and property 
is one of the greatest problems in Afghanistan. The  
demographic growth during decades of war has led to 
the fact that returning families bring with them new 
generations of children and grandchildren who also 
raise a claim to former land, of which only a small part 
(if at all) is left. In the urban centres of Afghanistan, 
large sections of the population who, due to unlawful 
occupation of their land by neighbours, family mem-
bers or violent actors (local warlords, security forces), 
cannot return to their original homes and have hardly 
any prospects of reclaiming their livelihoods in the 
country. This is a major factor for conflict escalation.
In Kabul alone, more than 40,000 families live in more 
than 50 so-called camps on state and privately-owned 
spaces devoid of any rights because they are not toler-
ated anywhere else. Amongst them are returnees from 
various repatriation waves from Pakistan and Iran, in-
ternally displaced people from war zones, economic 
refugees and landless peasants from poorer provinces 
of Afghanistan as well as the urban poor. A large part 
of these families had heeded the call of former Interim 
President Karzai to return to their home country and 
to rebuild it. Fourteen years later, many are still wait-
ing for land allocations that they had been promised 
(even those who had owned no land before, such as 
former nomads). For many internally displaced 
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the opportunity to build a road or a bazaar as a ‚shin-
ing example‘ in a certain area. Furthermore, develop-
ment cooperation agencies and the military rented 
properties at exorbitant prices from powerful local 
players who had no legitimacy among the population. 
By arming militias—for guarding infrastructure proj-
ects and, as of 2009, for a more intensified counterin-
surgency in various districts—, international actors 
have significantly contributed to multiplying the num-
ber of violent conflicts and those who participated in 
them.
These practices have given the wrong signal to the  
Afghan people who initially had high hopes of the rule 
of law and democracy. They represent blatant double 
standards that apparently do not take the population’s 
needs and entitlement to justice and public participation 
seriously. Investments were made in infrastructure in 
particularly conflict-ridden areas rather than in the 
people of Afghanistan. This has made the use of violence 
profitable and peace disadvantageous with regard to 
attracting development and infrastructure investments. 
Finally, the short-term character of projects, the pres-
sure to show success and to spend donor money on 
programme officials has led to interventions that pro-
ceed without sufficient knowledge of the situation, and 
without any impact on the long-term stabilization of 
Afghanistan.
Given the increasing success of the Taliban in seizing 
larger areas and even entire cities, it has become clear 
that the reconstruction process in the country has 
failed. However, even today the international commu-
nity, aid organizations and the military who intervened 
in Afghanistan in the framework of ISAF8 from 2001 to 
2014 still tend towards presenting ‘project Afghanistan’ 
as a success. The actual role of the intervening actors is 
concealed again by current statements such as that by 
the German Development Minister who stated that 
without security, further civilian development in the 
country is impossible.9  
8 \  NATO led International Security Assistance Force.
9 \  “Minister Müller: Sicherheit in Afghanistan ist Grundlage für eine  
nachhaltige Entwicklung”, BMZ 18 November 2015, www.bmz.de
Offering prospects for future wellbeing has become a 
matter of urgency given that Afghanistan has an above 
average number of young people: 46.2 per cent of the 
population or 12.3 million Afghans are 14 years and 
younger. Young people need educational support as 
well as vocational training programmes, measures to 
promote employment and education not only in  
Afghanistan itself but also in Germany, Europe and 
neighbouring countries. Legal access to labour markets 
abroad can make a strong contribution to removing 
the complex insecurity situation in Afghanistan. Voca-
tional training and job creation schemes in Afghanistan 
must be long-term, coherent and strategically adaptable 
to the constantly changing realities in the country.  
Close cooperation between the local economy, interna-
tional aid and economic organizations as well as inves-
tors, the relevant ministries in Afghanistan, chambers 
and associations as well as advisory institutions is ad-
visable. Financial transfers and investments by Afghans 
who already live abroad ought to be viewed as further 
support measures and therefore facilitated.
Dilemmas of external support and  
asssistance
German policymakers interpreted the temporary seizure 
of Kunduz by the Taliban in autumn 2015 as evidence 
that the international community was wrong about in 
the timing of troop withdrawal and how prepared the 
Afghan population was to provide for its own security. 
This interpretation is cynical when one considers the 
effect of contradicting practices of the intervening par-
ties in Afghanistan, which have reinivgorated armed 
opponents of the government and spread local insecu-
rity. Over the course of reconstruction, military and 
civilian actors have dealt with potentates–partially  
without further thought and at best naively–who pursued 
their own personal interests (local warlords, perpetrators 
of human rights crimes, Taliban, corrupt state officials 
and other local, not legitimized representatives) and 
provided them with good money. Examples of this are 
military and supply convoys that gave the Taliban huge 
amounts of money for safe passage on a stretch of road, 
or building companies and their clients that paid for 
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The structural challenges in the country—at present 
discussed under the topic of causes of displacement 
and how to counteract them—can be neither solved by 
military means nor by development cooperation, least 
of all by deportations (“repatriation”) that, apparently, 
are supposed to stop the ‘brain drain’. Instead, the Ger-
man government as well as those of the European Union, 
the OECD, BRICS and neighbouring countries of  
Afghanistan could make major contributions to secu-
rity by creating well-managed immigration systems. 
Within a short period of time, refugees ought to be 
able to obtain a status that allows them access to edu-
cation, training and further qualification measures as 
well as work as migrants, which will give them the 
chance of integrating into host societies. Opportunities 
for immigrants to temporarily qualify for legal migra-
tion (through immigration law, for instance) ought to 
remain open.
FURTHER READING
Ahmadi, B. (2016). The Forced Return of Afghan Refugees and Implications 
for Stability (Peacebrief). Washington, DC: USIP – United States Insti-
tute of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/publica-
tions/2016/01/13/the-forced-return-of-afghan-refugees-and-implica-
tions-stability.
Fishstein, P., & Murtaza E. A. (2015). Afghan Economic Policy, Institutions, 
and Society since 2001 (USIP Report). Washington, DC: USIP – United 
States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from http://www.usip.org/publica-
tions/2015/10/26/afghan-economic-policy-institutions-and-socie-
ty-2001.
International Organization for Migration. 2016. Afghanistan. IOM Humani-
tarian Compendium, 15 January, Retrieved from http://humanitarian-
compendium.iom.int/afghanistan/2016.
Mashal, M. (2014). Small and Medium Enterprises Development and Regional 
Trade in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit. Retrieved from http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?Edi-
tionId=724&ContentId=7&ParentId=7&Lang=en-US.
UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Homepage. 
https://unama.unmissions.org/.
UN HABITAT. 2015. State of Afghan Cities Project. Retrieved from http://
unhabitat.org/books/soac2015/
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under:  
cf. creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
bicc \  
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn 
Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH
Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany 
+49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, bicc@bicc.de 
www.bicc.de 
www.facebook.com/bicc.de 
Director for Research
Prof. Dr. Conrad Schetter 
Director for Administration
Michael Dedek
AUTHORS 
Dr Katja Mielke
Senior Researcher/ BICC
Dr Elke Grawert
Senior Researcher / BICC
EDITOR
Susanne Heinke
TRANSLATION
Heike Webb
SUPPORT
Elvan Isikozlu
PUBLICATION DATE
2 November 2016
 
EDITORIAL DESIGN   
Diesseits - Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf
Member of the 
